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Abstract 
Substation cyber assets are mission critical for 
protection and control of substations. Managing and 
ensuring their secure operation is of paramount 
importance. A known vulnerability is hidden failures 
which are responsible for about 10% of mis-
operations and their detrimental effects on system 
reliability. The paper presents an integrated 
centralized substation protection approach that is 
based on the recently developed setting-less relays 
which are integrated into a centralized substation 
protection scheme with the following features: (a) 
fast, dependable and secure protection of each 
substation protection zone by a settingless relay, (b) 
supervision of each settingless relay by validating 
relay input data by a substation wide state estimator, 
(c) self-healing against hidden failures by detecting 
and identifying compromised data and replacing 
them with estimated values, thus ensuring that the 
settingless relays will always operate on validated 
data. The paper provides a summary review of the 
settingless protective relay and introduces the 
Integrated Centralized Substation Protection Scheme 
(ICSP) which uses the data from all settingless relays 
in the substation to perform a substation wide state 
estimation. The state estimator uses a hypothesis 
testing algorithm to determine whether (a) data are 
valid with no faults or hidden failures, (b) data are 
valid and a fault exists in the system, or (c) some data 
are invalid due to hidden failures. In the last case, the 
state estimator uses the substation state and model to 
replace the compromised data with estimated values 
and thus enabling self-immunization against hidden 
failures. A byproduct of the method is the substation 
state estimate which is transmitted to the control 
center where it is used with the state from all 
substations to synthesize the system wide state 
estimate and model. Architectural issues are 
addressed as well as migration issues of existing 
systems into the proposed ICSP. 
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protection, dynamic state estimation, hidden failures 
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1. Introduction 
 
The technological advancements in communications 
and computational capabilities have paved the way for 
new approaches in power system protection and 
control. New approaches are necessary to confront the 
challenges introduced by the new, revolutionary 
changes in power systems. These challenges are 
concurrent with tremendous efforts by utilities to 
boost system reliability. Such efforts are undermined 
by mis-operations of the protection system. The rate 
of relay mis-operation, as a percentage of total 
operations is approximately 10 percent, as reported by 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) [1]. An analysis of protection failures reveals 
that the majority occurs because of hidden failures. 
Such failures are defined in [2] as “permanent 
defect[s] that will cause a relay or a relay system to 
incorrectly and inappropriately remove a circuit 
element(s) as a direct consequence of another 
switching event.” 
Present numerical relays have a limited capability to 
detect hidden failures. Presently, relays are not 
capable to correct the effects of the hidden failures nor 
they have the capability to detect the true condition of 
the power system in the presence of hidden failures. 
As a result, when a hidden failure is detected the only 
option is to inhibit the protection function. The 
affected protection system depends on other protection 
systems, unaffected by the hidden failure(s), to take 
the proper action. It should be apparent the protection 
system reliability is decreased. 
 
Relay manufacturers and researchers have proposed 
approaches that could minimize the effects of hidden 
failures and cope with other complexities. Along these 
lines, adaptive protection schemes and voting schemes 
have been proposed. Adaptive protection schemes 
have been proven to be complex and do not easily 
meet the speed that is required for protection. Voting 
schemes are not reliable as a hidden failure may affect 
several relays that participate in the voting – in this 
case the majority of relays may be taking a wrong 
decision. 
 
In response to these challenges, several new concepts 
have emerged. The idea of setting-less protection was 
inspired by the differential protection function, which 
is simple, features minimal settings, and most 
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importantly, does not require coordination with other 
protective relay functions [3], [4]. The setting-less 
protection relay monitors all physical laws that the 
device under protection must satisfy when it operates 
normally (i.e. unfaulted). This monitoring is 
accomplished by performing dynamic state 
estimation (DSE) using sampled value measurements. 
DSE continuously compares the collected 
measurements (i.e., sampled values) to the dynamic 
model of the protection zone and provides a 
quantitative assessment of how well the data fit the 
dynamic model. Specifically, the chi-square test 
calculates the probability that the measurements fit 
the model. The chi-square test typically returns a 
probability of 100% for healthy protection zones and 
0% for protection zones with any type of fault. 
Setting-less relays, as any other type of relay, are 
vulnerable to hidden failures which corrupt the 
measured values. Hence, a mechanism to detect such 
failures is essential for reliable protection of power 
systems.  
 
The objective of this paper is to incorporate setting-
less relays into an integrated centralized substation 
protection scheme (i.e., Integrated Centralized 
Substation Protection (ICSP)). The ICSP supervises 
the validity of the measured values streaming into the 
setting-less relays by performing a substation-wide 
state estimation, using data from all setting-less relays 
in the substation. In case that compromised data are 
detected, the ICSP has the capability to replace the 
compromised data with corrected data using the state 
estimates and the real time model. The paper details 
the computational procedures of the ICSP as well as 
the proposed system architecture. Section II presents 
the ICSP in as much detail as practical, given paper 
length restrictions. Section III discusses the 
architecture of the ICSP. Finally, Section IV provides 
an illustrative example. Section V provides 
concluding remarks and section VI discusses the 
usefulness of the proposed ICSP in providing the 
basic infrastructure for the energy management 
system of the future. 
 
 
2. Integrated Centralized Substation 
Protection  
 
We present an approach for reliable monitoring of the 
overall protection system. We prefer an 
implementation using merging units and setting-less 
relays for protection zones. The overall proposed 
structure is shown in Figure 1. The system consists of 
the instrumentation, the merging units, the setting-
less relays that provide protection for each protection 
zone, communications channels between relays and 
controls and telemetering and a substation wide 
quasi-dynamic state estimation to continuously 
monitor the integrity of the overall system. In our 
implementation, at the setting-less relays, the 
dynamic state estimation is performed 40 times per 
cycle using sampled values obtained with the 
merging units. This accommodates the standard 
sampling rate of 80 samples per cycle. This process 
has been demonstrated with extensive numerical 
experiments, in the laboratory and in the field.  
 
The setting-less relay can also compute the phasors of 
the V and I measurements and stream the phasor data 
to the station bus as indicated in Figures 1 and 2. The 
phasor measurements are used to perform a 
substation-wide state estimator. All the measurements 
from all relays represent a high data redundancy for 
the substation wide state estimator. We performed an 
analysis of actual substations and the redundancy is 
above 2000% meaning that the number of 
measurements from all relays is typically 20 times the 
number of state variables describing the substation 
state. The substation-wide state estimator is 
implemented with three additional important 
applications: (a) detection of bad data, (b) hypothesis 
testing, and (c) correction/replacement of 
compromised data, if any. The large redundancy 
makes these applications robust and provides the 
mechanism by which the individual setting-less relays 
are supervised and ensure that they will always 
operate with validated data. A concise description of 
these functions is provided next. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of Overall Approach 
 
Substation-Wide Dynamic State Estimation Module  
The substation-wide dynamic state estimation module 
operates on the entire measurement set of the 
substation. No other information is needed. The DSE 
computes the best estimate of the substation dynamic 
state. Subsequently, the goodness of fit between the 
measurements and the substation model is computed 
via the well-known chi-square test which calculates 
the probability of goodness of fit between the 
measurement and the substation model. This 
probability is also referred to as confidence level. A 
high probability of goodness of fit, i.e. more than 
0.90 results in declaring all the data in the substation 
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valid. In this case no further action is required. 
Otherwise, the hypothesis module is called to identify 
the root cause of the bad data via hypothesis testing 
and correct/replace compromised data. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Module. This module is initiated 
when the dynamic state estimation has declared the 
existence of bad data (data abnormality). The 
objective of this module is to identify the root cause 
of the abnormality, i.e. power fault or hidden failure 
or both. There exist three possibilities: (a) one or 
more power faults exist in the system, (b) one or 
more hidden failures, or (c) simultaneous occurrence 
of faults and hidden failures. The probability of 
having two simultaneous faults or two simultaneous 
hidden failures within the substation is very low. 
Realistically, we consider the following possible 
events as most likely to occur: (a) occurrence of a 
hidden failure, (b) occurrence of a power fault, and 
(c) simultaneous occurrence of a power fault and a 
hidden failure. Other possible events will have 
insignificant probabilities of occurring 
simultaneously. 
 
The hypothesis testing is guided by the following 
observations: (a) at the substation level the 
redundancy is high (over 2000%) – this implies that 
the existence of leveraging points are not existent and 
therefore normalized residuals from the state 
estimator can be used as guidance of where the 
problem is located. (b) System is continuously 
running – this implies that any abnormal event will be 
captured in real time. The probability of simultaneous 
failure events occurring at exactly the same time is 
low. Thus the hypotheses to be considered should be 
limited to first order events.  
 
The mechanics of hypothesis testing are as follows: 
First, suspect measurements are identified from 
normalized residuals which are provided by the DSE. 
Second, suspect measurements are grouped using the 
source of the data (merging units) and also by 
protection zone. Third, protection zones are identified 
for which the protection functions have reported a 
fault. Subsequently, three types of hypothesis testing 
are performed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis Type 1 (H1): Remove suspect 
measurements and rerun DSE. If probability is high 
(more than 0.9), then: (a) removed measurements are 
bad, (b) identify root cause, (c) issue diagnostics, and 
(d) replace bad data with estimated values. End 
hypothesis testing. Otherwise go to H2. 
 
Hypothesis Type 2 (H2): (determine if a fault 
decision is correct). For the reported faulted device, 
remove all internal device measurements and remove 
the faulted device model from the substation model. 
Then rerun DSE.  If probability is high (more than 
0.9), then: (a) the device/protection zone is truly 
experiencing an internal fault.  Allow zone setting-
less relay to trip the faulted device. End hypothesis 
testing. 
Hypothesis Type 3 (H3): This test combines type 1 
and type 2 hypothesis testing to cover the case of a 
simultaneous fault and a hidden failure. 
 
Data Correction Module. The data 
correction/replacement module is executed when a 
hidden failure of instrumentation channels has been 
identified. The hypothesis testing has identified a 
number of compromised measurements. Then using 
the model of the entire substation and the real time 
operating conditions (both provided by the DSE) the 
physical quantities represented by these 
measurements are computed (estimated values). The 
computed quantities are sampled values. 
Subsequently, the ICSP streams the estimated values 
of the compromised data into the process bus, 
replacing the actual data collected by the merging 
units. Now any computing device, including the 
setting-less relays, using the sampled values at the 
process bus will be using corrected data. 
 
To complete the picture, the substation-wide state 
estimator also communicates with the control center 
(EMS). Specifically, the validated results (substation 
state estimate) from the state estimator are streamed 
to the EMS where the results from all substations can 
be time aligned and synthesize the operating 
conditions (state) of the entire system. It is 
emphasized that the proposed approach facilitates 
efficient communications. Specifically, each 
substation sends to the EMS only the substation state 
which comprises a very small number of data. When 
connectivity changes, then connectivity data are 
transmitted by exception. Similarly if model changes 
occur, the new mathematical model will be 
transmitted by exception. The end result is that while 
the merging units in a substation may be collecting 
data at rates of millions of data points per second 
(sampled values), the frequency domain state 
(phasors) are only a few tens of data points per cycle 
and per substation. 
 
In summary, the ICSP provides a real time system for 
supervising the operation of the setting-less relays in 
a substation and ensuring that the data streaming into 
these relays are validated data. More importantly, in 
case of hidden failures, the data compromised by the 
hidden failure are replaced with estimated values 
form the validated substation model and operating 
state to ensure the continuous dependable and secure 
operation of the relays. The ICSP provides self-
healing capability for the system in case of hidden 
failures. The proposed ICSP represents a new 
approach which has become possible with technology 
that has been developed only in the past few years. 
Page 2654
  
3. Communications and Data 
Management 
 
Critical to this work is the ability to manage data and 
communications between the various devices (i.e., 
setting-less relays and ICSP) within the substation 
and also between the substation and the control 
center. Therefore, we have defined the details of the 
system architecture, which specifies data 
management, communication protocols, and the 
hierarchical structure of the system. Figure 2 
illustrates the overall proposed architecture with 
emphasis on the data flow and data handling. The 
lower part of the Figure shows the architecture to deal 
with sampled values. Note that all SV are 
concentrated on four circular buffers which are 
handled with the sample value data concentrator 
(SVDC). The four circular buffers handle the local 
SVs and the telemetered SV with full redundancy 
(one primary for the local SV and one backup as well 
as one primary for the telemetered SV and one 
backup). The SVDC time aligns the SVs as they may 
be coming from the various merging units with 
different time latencies and orders them in the 
circular buffer.    Time synchronization is critical for 
reliable operation of both setting-less relays and 
centralized protection schemes. The required timing 
accuracy for such applications is less than 1 μs. 
Accordingly, we propose using the IEEE 1588v2 time 
synchronization standard known as the precision time 
protocol (PTP) as illustrated in Figure 2. This 
protocol operates through a data network and can 
achieve time accuracy of less than 1 μs.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overall Architecture of the Proposed Scheme 
 
The upper part of the Figure shows a similar 
architecture for phasor data, indicated as station bus. 
The station bus facilitates data exchange between 
setting-less relays and ICSP. The scheme also 
accommodates telemetered phasor data. This includes 
phasor quantities streaming from setting-less relays to 
ICSP as well as telemetered phasors at a rate of up to 
1 sample/cycle. Moreover, upon detecting hidden 
failure the ICSP uses the estimated state and the real 
time model of the substation to estimate the sampled 
values that are affected by the hidden failure and 
streams the estimated SV to the process bus replacing 
the compromised data. This way the setting-less 
relays will be now operating on validated data.  
 
The figure also shows communication links to other 
substations and the control center. The availability of 
the data on circular buffers facilitates accessibility of 
the data from any application. 
 
Control functions, not shown in the figure, are 
executed with GOOSE messaging. GOOSE message 
exchanges between the IED and ICSP takes place in 
the station bus. These GOOSE messages include but 
are not limited to breaker status, disconnect status, 
setting-less relays operation status, and ICSP 
permissive signal to setting-less relays. 
 
 
4. Illustrative Example 
 
   The concept of ICSP has been tested with numerous 
numerical experiments. Here we present 
results/numerical experiment on a relatively small 
substation which comprises five protection zones, as 
shown in Figures 3 and 4 [5]. Specifically, we 
consider only the following five Protection Zones of 
the substation: (a) 115 kV Transmission Line, (b) 115 
kV Bus, (c) 115/13.8 kV, 36 MVA Transformer, (d) 
13.8 kV Bus, and (e) 13.8 kV Distribution Line (one 
of the two). The objective of the numerical 
experiments was to prove the concept and show that 
the system can meet the time response requirements of 
a protection system so that can be implemented on a 
larger scale.  
 
Figure 3: Example Test System for Numerical 
Experiments 
 
We present a simulated a hidden failure scenario of 
CT reverse polarity. Typically, this event occurs 
following pre-commissioning activities for a new 
substation or maintenance activities for an existing 
substation. In either case, the problem may remain 
hidden following the energization until the effected 
zone is loaded. This case simulates the CT reverse 
polarity to analyze the response of both the setting-
less relay and the ICSP. Specifically, we modeled CT-
10 (see figure 4) phases A, B, and C, which provide 
the setting-less relay of the transformer zone with the 
current measurements at the transformer secondary, 
with reverse polarity by swapping the terminals of 
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each CT at the relay terminals. The sequence of events 
starts with energizing the substation without load. 
Then, the transformer is loaded with a 15 MW load at 
time t=3s.  
 
Figure 4: Example Test System: One line diagram with 
instrumentation 
 Figure 5 shows the electric current waveforms of 
the secondary side of the transformer (CT-9 and CT-
10) depicted from the setting-less relay of the 
transformer zone. The figure shows a 180 degree-
phase shift between the current waveforms extracted 
from CT 9 (i.e., the healthy CT) and CT 10 because of 
the reverse polarity. Figure 5 also depicts the setting-
less relay operations for this event, which show that 
the relay operated and initiated a trip signal to isolate 
the transformer. This response is a relay mis-operation 
because of the hidden failure. 
The ICSP responded to the event of the hidden failure 
by fisrt detecting bad data via the hypothesis testing 
and then initiating hypothesis testing. The ICSP 
computed normalized residuals show high values. 
Figure 6 shows the nine highest values of the 
normalized residuals. Note that the measurement from 
CT-10, phase B, has the highest normalized residual. 
The common mode criteria verification revealed that 
all three phases measurements extracted from CT-10 
exceeded the threshold. The threshold is a user 
selected parameter; in this case we used the value of 2. 
Consequently, the measurements extracted from CT-
10 are classified as suspicious measurements. The 
ICSP initiated hypothesis testing by removing the CT-
10 measurements. The hypothesis testing was 
successful and returned a high confidence level. The 
ICSP concluded that there is a hidden failure within 
the substation and did not detect any faulty zones. 
Additionally, the ICSP precisely identified the 
instrumentation channels that have been compromised 
by the hidden failure. Subsequently, the ICSP created 
a virtual merging unit that computes the phase A, B 
and C currents from the estimated substation state and 
substation model. The computed estimated sampled 
values replace the compromised data from CT-10 and 
attached merging unit. At the same time a diagnostic 
is issued and transmitted to the control center operator 
to alarm him/her of the detected hidden failure and the 
need for a repair. This case demonstrates the 
advantage of redundancy in the measurements, which 
makes the hypothesis testing very efficient. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Setting-less relay of the transformer zone for 
the test case 
 
  
 
Figure 6:  Highest values of the normalized residuals 
 
The detected faulty waveforms in the setting-less relay 
were replaced with the estimated signals computed in 
the ICSP and streamed to the setting-less relay, as 
shown in Figure 7. Note that there is a period of about 
two cycles after t=3s for which the setting-less relay 
operates with compromised data from the hidden 
failure. During this period the setting-less relay reports 
zero confidence level. At time t=3.032s the corrected 
data start arriving at the process bus and the setting-
less relay now operates on validated data. Note on the 
figure the reversal of the electric current data and the 
almost immediate response of the setting-less relay to 
Page 2656
  
100% confidence level. This process demonstrates the 
speed of the ICSP to self-heal the protection system 
within two cycles and enable the correct operation of 
the setting-less relay even in the presence of the 
hidden failure.  
 
  
Figure 7:  Setting-less relay corrected response 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes an Integrated Centralized 
Substation Protection (ICSP) scheme, which operates 
at the substation level. It has the capability to detect 
hidden failures in real time and to take corrective 
action. Specifically it has the following attributes: 
 Supervises protection functions of individual 
protection zones 
 Detects and identifies type and location of 
Hidden Failures. In this case computes and 
replaces the compromised data and streams the 
corrected data into the process bus for secure and 
dependable operation of the setting-less relays. 
 Determines existence of faults and in this case 
allows zone protective relays to operate  
The process starts with data streaming from the 
setting-less relay to the ICSP as well as telemetered 
data also streaming into the ICSP. The ICSP processes 
the data by performing substation-wide Dynamic State 
Estimation. This process verifies the consistency (or 
inconsistency) between the measurement and the 
substation model. Upon detecting inconsistency 
through the chi-square test, the ICSP performs 
hypothesis testing to identify the root cause of the 
inconsistencies, i.e. hidden failures or faults or both. 
We have demonstrated, through numerical 
experiments, the scheme’s capability of detecting 
hidden failures and to take corrective action in case of 
hidden failures.  
Moreover, we defined the IEC 61850-based 
architecture of the ICSP with high degree of 
redundancy at every layer. The architecture entails 
separating the process bus and the station bus into two 
separate local networks. We proposed PRP topology 
for the process and station buses to satisfy the 
criterion of 0s data recovery. Furthermore, we 
introduced data concentrators at both the station and 
process buses. The data concentrators aggregate data 
from different sources and overcome the challenge of 
data latency. The proposed architecture is fully 
redundant. 
 
6. Future Energy Management System 
 
The proposed ICSP provides an infrastructure that 
will be fundamental for the future Energy 
Management Systems. Specifically it provides a 
distributed dynamic state estimator that makes 
available the operating state of the system at speeds 
not available today, i.e. once per cycle. In addition 
provides all the data collected at a substation at two 
different time scales, i.e. sampled values (typically 
200 microsecond resolution) and phasor values 
(typically 16 ms resolution). This data are provided in 
redundant circular buffers and are available to any 
other applications. 
 
This infrastructure is necessary for the future Energy 
Management Systems. The introduction of new 
resources in power systems with faster controls 
present new operational challenges which require 
faster detection of system conditions and faster 
responses. Decision-making in the future grid 
requires innovative approaches that overcome the 
existing limitations. These approaches include 
advanced data management, sophisticated analytics 
capabilities, and massive computational capabilities. 
Our proposed ICSP and its architecture provide the 
required infrastructure at the substation level for the 
future energy management system.  There is an 
enormous amount of measurement data at the 
substation platform, which are managed by the ICSP, 
the information (substation state and topology) 
included in the data is extracted and is streamed to the 
control center. This represents a drastic reduction of 
data being communicated to the control center 
(dramatic reduction in throughput) without losing any 
information about the substation and at a speed that 
has not been possible with previous technologies. The 
availability of the  accurate substation models at the 
control center, updated with frequency of once per 
cycle, provide opportunities for much faster real time 
applications. This capability make the control center 
more effective in decision-making and insures a 
reliable and cost effective operation and control for 
the power system network. 
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The future EMS will utilize the distributed state 
estimator of the ICSP, as a source of substation real 
time operating conditions and substation models to 
support all required control center applications. 
Specifically, each substation sends through the ICSP 
to the EMS its real time model and operating 
conditions. Any substation topology change, 
switching, tap changes, breaker operation, etc. it will 
be communicated to the control center with end to 
end latency of not exceeding 2 cycles. As a matter of 
fact while the operating conditions of the substation 
are streamed continuously (up to 60 times per 
second), the substation model is communicated by 
exception when a changed has occurred. This way the 
throughput is drastically reduced.  Along with the 
operating conditions of the substation the ICSP can 
send substation alarms that can be used for increased 
awareness of substation conditions and activate any 
security measurements to insure reliable operation.   
 
The EMS synthesizes the overall system state from 
the states of each substation in real time. This 
information can be used in many applications 
associated with power system economic operation 
and control as shown in Figure 8. The synthesis of the 
entire system state from the substation states is 
straightforward because each substation state is time 
tagged with GPS accuracy. Simply stated, the states 
of all substations with the same time tag are 
combined to provide the system state at that specific 
time tag. Note that it is important that the time tags 
are accurate. The ICSP provides an accuracy of one 
microsecond which is more than enough to guarantee 
a reliable process. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Future Energy Management System 
In summary, the ICSP paves the way for advanced 
(next generation) EMS that is capable to perform 
several applications with accurate and validated 
models in real time and overcome the challenges 
posed by the future power grid. 
 
7. References 
 
[1] Protection System Misoperation Task Force, 
“Misoperations Report,” NERC Planning Committee, 
2014. 
 
[2]  S. Tamronglak, S. H. Horowitz, A. G. Phadke, and J. 
S. Thorp, “Anatomy of power system blackouts: 
Preventive relaying strategies,” IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 708–715, Apr. 
1996. 
 
[3] S. Meliopoulos et al., “Integration & automation: 
From protection to advanced energy management 
systems,” in Bulk Power System Dynamics and 
Control-IX Optimization, Security and Control of the 
Emerging Power Grid (IREP), 2013 IREP 
Symposium, 2013, pp. 1–11. 
[4] PSERC Report, “Setting-less protection”. 
 
[5] H. Albinali, S. Meliopoulos, “Dynamic State 
Estimation Based Centralized Protection Scheme" 
accepeted for PowerTech Confnernce 
 
[6] Kirmann, H., “Seamless redundancy,” ABB Report. 
 
[7] McGhee, J., and Goraj, M., “Smart high voltage 
substation based on IEC 61850 process bus and IEEE 
1588 time synchronization,” First IEEE International 
Conference on Smart Grid Communications, 
Gaithersburg, MD, 2010, pp. 489–494. 
 
[8] Communication networks and systems for power 
utility automation – Part 9-2: Specific Communication 
Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values, IEC 
Standard 61850-9-2, Ed. 2, Mar. 2010. 
 
 [9] Retty, H. A., “Evaluation and standardizing of phasor 
data concentrators,” MSc Dissertation, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2013. 
 
[10] Power System Relaying Committee, “IEEE Guide for 
phasor data concentrator requirements for power 
system protection, control, and monitoring,” 2013. 
 
[11] Kanabar, M., Adamiak, M. G., and Rodrigues, J., 
“Optimizing wide area measurement system 
architectures with advancements in Phasor Data 
Concentrators (PDCs),”  IEEE Power & Energy 
Society General Meeting, Vancouver, BC, 2013, pp. 
1–5.  
 
 
Page 2658
